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APPROVED BY M"EIVraERS OF ~~--Jitte~IS COt"lrJjITTEE : 
~he purpose of this paper is to examine the present 
political situation in Greece and the events that took 
~lace from the time that Papandreo~'s Center Gnion ?brty 
carne to power in 1964 to the military coup d'e~at in 1967. 
however, in order to 6evelop a picture of WIled, led to the 
cOup of 1967, it is necessary not only to discuss specific 
e~/ents -!?rior and during the cou-p. but also to present a 
brief background of modern Greek politics since Greece's 
independence from the Turks in 1821. 
~he paper is divided into five chapters: the first 
chapter briefly summarizes the events that took place on 
April 21, 1967; the second traces the events thLt led 
to the April 21 coup d'etat; the third indicates what 
the situation was before hpril 21, 1967; the fourth 
discusses the policies 6nd governing methods of the 
present military regime; the fifth is a concluding 
statement. 
There is little data in books or professional 
journals about recent Greek politics. Oonsequently, 
this work was largely dependent on newspapers, news 
magazines, and the testimony of a number of Greeks 
for information. 
The Greek people are presently under the 
dictatorial rule of a military regime. Resistance 
against the regime appears to be increasing. AS 
resistance increases, more repressive measures and 
unrest will develop, until the country erupts into 
a bloody civil war. 
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CHAPTER I 
IwrRODUCTION 
At 2:30 on the morning of the 21st of April 1967, 
the Greek army carried out a coup d'etat and replaced 
the civilian democratic rule of Greece with a military 
dictatorship. 
The coup d'etat was initiated with the sudden 
arrest of political leaders and the take over of 
communications media and police districts in all major 
cities of Greece with armored vehicles manned with battle-
ready soldiers. 
The coup came so suddenly and the movement of those 
carrying it out w~s so smooth that no one even suspected 
that a coup had been contemplated. 
Eight soldiers with machine guns and rifles with 
fixed bayonets broke into the hOilie of Andreas P8pandreou, 
son of the Prime Minister and a representative in the 
Greek Parliament, and dragged everyone out of bed, shouting 
"Where is Andreas ll • Andreas and his family thought at 
first that the house had been invaded by terrorists to 
assasinate them. 
Similar situations were repeated throughout the 

country, as the military junta was determined to eliminate 

I 

I 

i I , I 
2 
all of its political opposition, by arresting and jailing 
most of the national and community political leadership 
of Greece. 
Known supporters of the Papandreou regime were 
arrested immediately. Confidential sourcesl in the 
service of the military junta indicate that some of the 
most able career officers were either retired or were 
arrested and jailed without any regard to their rank, 
professional expertise, or service record. Career civil 
servants were also replaced immediately by relatives and 
trusted friends of the regime. Labor unions were dissolved 
by military order and then re-established, with their new 
membership made up of junta-approved people. Voluntary, 
professional, and civil organizations were reorganized 
along the same lines, and their leadership was hand-picked 
by the military governor of each military district. 
The civilian leadership of small communities, such 
as the village presidents, was replaced by appointed 
military officers. 
Reorganization in Greece was complete. Most of the 
civilian and political leadership was replaced by military 
officers and their supporters at the lowest level, in the 
smallest village and smallest organization. 
lA number of Greek sources must remain confidential 

out of fear of reprisals by the regime. 

CHAPTER II 
WHAT LED TO THE COUP D'ETAT 
The story of the present military dictatorship goes 
back to December 1966, when George Papandreou resigned 
as Prime Minister of Greece. The resignation came as 
a result of the struggle between King Oonstantine and 
Papandreou over the question of whether Papandreou had the 
power to fire one of his minj.sters without the King I s approval. 
Following Papandreou's resignation, King Oonstantine 
appointed a caretaker government and promised that elections 
would be forthcoming in May of 1967. 
King Oonstantine promised that elections would be 
held even though it was not likely that he would allow 
nB~ionBl elections to take place as long as the Center 
Union Party· was slJrong. 'l'he leaders of the Oenter Union, 
George and Andreas Papandreou (the King's bitte.c enemies), 
were very popular with the Greek people, and the King was 
fearful that a national election as promised would be 
turned into a national plebiscite against the royal family. 
*Note: Greek political Parties with abbreviations 
were as follows: 
Political Parties Political Spectrum 
Center Union Party (CUP) 
Liberal Democratic Center (FIDIK) 
National Radical Union (ERE) 
Progressive Party (KP) 
United Democratic Left (EDA) 
Center 
Center Right 
Right
Right 
Left 
4­
At this point (in order to attraQt attention away 
from the issue of the promised elections), the persecution 
of Andreas Papandreou began, and in December of 1966, 
-(ihe Athens prosecuting attorney charged Andreas with high 
treason and asked that his immunity as a member of the 
Pa~liament be lifted. Andreas was accused of being the 
ring-leader of a leftist faction composed of young officers 
in the Greek armed forces; of intending to overthrow the 
Monarchy by force, and of wishing to establish a socialistic 
government in Greece. Although ERE, one of the major 
political parties, supported this move, smaller political 
parties, as well as the CUP, the dominant party, opposed it. 
During the months preceding the coup, there was 
heated parliamentary maneuvering and double-dealing 
between the political parties and the King. 
On March, 30, 1907, the CUP sponsored legislation 
(protecting deputies of Parliament from arrest during the 
election period) intended to provoke a parliamentary crisis 
and bring about the resignation of the caretaKer government. j 
This move was successful, and on april 3, the King, i 
bypassing the CUP, appointed Panayiotis Kanelopoulos, the I' 
I 
I' 
leader of the ERE, as the new head of government. 
I 
Because the CUP had a majority in the parliament and 
the new government evidently could not receive a vote of 
confidence, the King told Kanelopoulos to disolve 
5 
Parliament. 2 Kanelopoulos was told hy the King to continue 
as the head of a service government and prepare for 
elections within forty-five days, as required by the 1952 
contitution. 
During this period Andreas Papandreou would no 
longer be a deputy, but a candidate for re-electiun. His 
immunity as a member of Parliament would be removed, and 
he would be subject to arrest. As indicated above, be had 
already been charged with high treason. 
Andreas's arrest was expected to provoke large scale 
demonstrations in the major cities of Greece and, 
consequently, to give the King Bnd his supporters an excuse I
. I 
to ~ostpone the May elections. 
It had become apparent that the CUP would win 
over-whelmingly in free elections and that the royal 
family and its supporters would be in trouble politically. 
Upon dissolution of Parliament, Kanelopoulos evidently 
came to an understanding with George Papandreou that 
~ndreas would not be arrested. Apparently Kanelopoulos 
did not play the game as was planned by the King and ~he Army. 
As the agreement between the leaders of the two 
major parties became evident, the Army Colone1s5 struck 
on April 21, aG 2:30 in the morning; Kanelopoulos was 
2Jtephen Rousseas, The Death of a Demo~r~cy-Greece
and the American Conscience (New YOr~k-~:~~G"'r--o-v-e~P~r~e-s~s·--I~D~!~c-., 1967) 
p. 61. 
3The agreement obviously was only a pretext. The 
efficiency of the coup indicates extensive planning. 
6 
arrested along with other Greek political leaders. 
When The Coup Was Carried Out 
Moments after midnight on April 21, soldiers in 
battle dress, began to appear in every key city and town 
and at every major street and intersection allover Greece. 
Radio stations, airports, railroads and all communication 
and transportation media were seized by the Army. 
Greece's borders were closed, and its communications 
with the outside \'Jorld stopped. No planes could land 
or take off, and arriving ships were turned away
from ports. Suddenly, a land of 8,)50,000 people,
roughly the size of the state of New York, found 
itself totally cut off from the rest of a puzzled 
world, in the first mililary takeover in Free 
Europe since the 1930's. 
The leaders of the coup invoked the royal name in 
every action they took. They sought to give legitimacy 
to their actions by fostering the impression that they 
were in the name of his Highness the King. 
The leaders moved quickly, indiscriminately arresting 
all political leaders regardless of party, as indicated 
by the following:5 
In Athens' Kolonaki district, three soldiers 
and a captain called at: 2 a.m. upon Premier 
Panayotis Kanelopoulos, who had heard of trouble 
and barricaded his door. The officer explained 
4uGreece", Time, (April 28, 1967), p. 28. 
5Ibid. 
7 

that they had come Lo protect him. ~ need 

no protection ll , cried Kanelopoulos, "I am 

Premier of Greece ll The soldiers broke
• 
down the door. "vJhy don't you kill me here? II , 
the Premier asked. The soldiers hustled 
him swiftly into an army truck and drove him 
off to a detention center. 
In his suburban home at Kastri, a political 
foe of Kanelopoulos, former premier George 
Papandreou, was dragged out of bed and 
marched off without even being given time to 
put on his shoes; he had to carry them 
along. His leftist son Andreas, sleeping some 
miles away was a particular target of the 
military; they sent eight soldiers and a 
captain to fetch him. They overpowered his 
bodyguard, smashed a glass door while breaKing 
into the house, and dragged Andreas off in 
his underpants, his feet bleeding from the 
glass. 
The scene was much the S8me allover Athens. 
By 3:00 a.m., practicvlly all of Greece's leading
politicians,of almost every persuasion and 
leaning, had been rounded up and herded into 
detention centers in downtown Athens. The 
military suspended key clauses of the constitution, 
banned strikes and all public gatherings, im90sed 
censorship on the press, closed schools, banks 
and stores, did away with the need for search 
warrants and set up special military courts to 
try violators. 
Although King Constantine attempted to persuade 
his army friends to reverse the course of events, he was 
unsuccessful. He finally went along with the junta. 
It was reported that: 6 
The Putschists rounded up over five thousand 
persons in three categories--suspects, potentially
dangerous and known enemies--in those two hours 
(allowing themselves a one hundred per cent margin 
of error in::.;,,,, numerical estimate). 
6George Bailey, liThe Puritan Revolt in Greece ll , 
The Reporter, (May 18, 1967), p. 19. 
During its first one hundred days the military 
dictatorship took steps to insure its stay in power 
through terrorism of the Greek people by mbrtial law, 
by setting down rules of what the people ~ould do and 
could not do, and by determining what books they could 
read and how they shOuld dress. Some of the steps tak~n 
during this period by the junta to reform the moral 
chara~ter of the Greeks are-indicated as follows:? 
Special ~iLitary courts-martial have been set 
up allover the country to punish Greeks who 
offended against King, Church or Jun~a. In 
At~ens 8 worke~ w~s se~~enced t? one ~ear in 
prlson for "benavlng llke a 'reddy boy , a 
tradesman to six months for "disobedience to 
authorities" . Ivlikis Theodora"Kis, the noted 
leftist musician, who composed the score for 
the film "L.orba the Greek", last week vJas 
sentenced in absentia to 5~ months in prison 
for offending the honor of the royal family. 
An estimated 150 to 200 Greeks are already 
behind bars on such charges, and more are 
arrested each week. 
The junta also seeks to reform Greece by 
issuirig an almost endless of do's and don'ts. 
A few outlandish decrees, such as the ban on 
beards, were prudently withdrawn, but others 
have stuck. The junta has blacklisted the 
works of nearly 300 Greek and scor~s of foreign 
authors, some Red, but others simply liberal, 
such as Senator J.W. Fulbright. They have 
stripped Actress Melina Mercouri and some 
400 other Greeks abroad of their citizenship, 
because they have "lost their Greek soul and 
conscience". rrlhey have banned who's who in 
Greece; •.• A decree forbidding five or more 
persons to as~emble without prior police 
permission has all but killed Athen's social 
life. 
8 
7 tlGreec e: the li'irst 100 Day s ", Time, (Augu st 4, 1967), 
p. 29-30. 
-----------------......----""""-1'11': 
IIi 
9 
As soon as the three leaders (Pattakos, Papadopoulos 
and l"iakarezos) of the junta \vere sworn into office by the 
Primate of Greece, they appointed Constantine Kollias 
as Premier. He was the sole civilian in the junta 
government, and prior to his appointment as Premier he 
served as the chief prosecutor in the Greek Supreme Court. 
Initially, Papadopoulos accepted the position of 
Minister to the premier, Pattakos took over the ministry 
of the interior, and r"lakarezos became minister of 
coordination. Although all three apparently had equal 
power, Papadopoulos gradually emerged as the boss. 
According to Time,8 Papadopoulos in a three month 
period established a general directorate of governmental 
policy, operating under his personal control. The 
directorate gave. him veto power over all laws drafted 
by the various ministers. In addition, Papadopoulos created 
his own cabine~ which superseded the work of regular 
ministries in fields such as press censorship, sports 
and civil service. Papado~oulos also relieved Pattakos 
of command of the politically powerful Armored Forces 
Training Center near Athens and gave command of the Center 
to his own men. In a conference wivh Makarios, President 
of Cyprus, Papadopoulos declared, "I am the boss in Greece". 9 
8l1Greece: I am the Boss II, Ti1E.e. t (September 15, 1967) t 
p. 39-40. 
9Ibid • 
10 
Before the end of the junta's first eight months 
in power there were signs that King Constantine was not 
satisfied with the role he played in the newly formed 
government. Traditionally, the King is the commander-in­
chief of the Greek Armed Forces and is thought to have 
complete control over'~he Royal Greek Army. However, 
this was not the case under the new military government. 
The King's power over and his influence within the Armed 
Forces were weakened because the new government was composed 
of military men who had the support and loyalty of the 
Ii 
Greek Armed Forces. This kind of support was, of course, 
critically essential for the success of the coup d ' etst. 
Although Papadopoulos seemed to be in complete 
control of the Royal Greek Armed Forces, King Constantine 
on December 13, 1967, attempted a counGer-coup against 
the military dictatorship. He was unsuccessful in his 
effort to rally military support against the junta.10 
When King Constantine realized that his counter-coup 
had failed, he escaped to Rome with the Royal family. 
The King's escape to Italy eliminated him as a 
serious contender for power. Certain confidential Greek 
sources contend that King Constantine just wanted to find 
a way out, since he was unable to control or influence 
the direction the junta was taking. Others contend that 
10Stockton Bayard, "How the Colonels Trapped the King", 
The Reporter, (February 22, 1968), p. 31-33. 
11. 

the King did not act very rationally and did not plan 
the counter-coup very carefully. 
Since the junta had the whole country in a tight 
grip, all the movements made by Constantine were likely 
known to it, as indicated in the following: ll 
The junta knew all of Constantine's movements. 

They knew he used his trips to talk to the 

loyal officers. In fact, the King was officially

warned that his excursions and conspiratorial 

meetings were frowned upon. Presumably all of 

Constantine's communications were known to the 

junta. Indeed, the colonels may well have been 

able to control what information was allowed 

into royal hands and added some of their own. 

There was almost nothing the Palace could 

accomplish in secret. 

If the junta knew of Constantine's every move, 
~hen it is obvious that the military dictators were 
aware of what the King was planning and did nothing 
to stop it, until the countercoup was declared. The 
junta was not concerned at all about the events planned 
for December 13, 1967. liThe junta \-1aS so confident of 
the People's mood that it did not even disconnect 
the city's phone system as it had done during the coup 
that brought it to power last April".12 
11Stockton Bayard, "HO\'J the Colonels Trapped the Kingll, 
The Reporte~, (February 22, 1968), p. 31. 
12Ibic.!, p. 31. 
See 
The Political Situation In Greece From 1944 to Our 
Days. A Greek Government Pubrication (Athens: Ministry To The 
"i"C". - ,rrime Minister, Press And Information Department, Foreign 
Press Division, 1968), p. 16-18. 
12. 
The junta bad set a trap for the King. Its success 
eliminated him as an obstacle to the junta's rule and at 
the same time showed thBt Constantine was not popular 
with the Greek people and the Royal Army. 
Following Constantine's abortive countercoup, tbe 
junta retired or dismissed most of the senior army 
officers. This was done not only to eliminate any 
opposition that might still exist within the army, but 
.. 
also to make room for the promotion of junior officers 
and to complete the "Revolution" by installing AI'med 
Forces friends and supporters into every key position. 
According to Stockton Bayard; 
The junta had dismissed not dozens but hundreds 
of senior officers to make way for the young
and ambitious in the lower ranks. Some sixty
senior officers have so far been removed 
since December 13, on suspicion of sympathy
if not support of the King. 13 
Papadopoulos, by removing the old hierBrchy from 
the Armed Forces, succeeded in his attempt to eliminate 
any possible competitors for power. The Army lost its 
old leadership and was replaced by Espadopoulos' loyal 
men. Papadopoulos was thus in complete control of tbe 
only body that could turn the tables in Greece. 
Because it was necessary according to the 1952' 
constitution that all governmental operations have the 
13 
approval of the King, and because the King had escaped 
to Italy following his abortive countercoup, the junta 
moved quickly to solve this problem, as indicated: 14 
The King confided to friends that he had 
no plans for an immediate return. Meanwhile, 
the government in Athens seemed to be preparing
for a somewhat more prolonged royal absence. 
By decree, it appointed an administrative and 
household staff for the temporary regent,
Lieut. General George Zoetakis, so that he 
can carryon the full official duties of 
Greece's head of state. 
Although General Zoetakis was given no power as 
head of state except that given to him by the ruling 
junta, his role serves to give legitimacy to actions 
taken by the military government. Greece is still a 
royal monarchy under the law. 
Around January 1968, Andreas Papandreou was 
released from prison,15 the result of political 
pressure from the U.S.".A. and other wes.tern countries. 
He was later deported to Paris, where he set up 
headouarters of a Greek government in exile. 16 
Papandreou became Premier of the exile government ar.d 
Kalliyiannis Vice Premier. Ampatielos was designated 
14nGreece ff Time (January 5, 1968), p. 32., -' 
15Ibid , p. 32. 
16M. Periphanakis, "Formation of Government Outside 
Greece Gives Premiership to Andreas Papandreou", Atlantis, 
LXXV (October 6, 1968), p. 1. 
14 
as minister of labor, Melina Mercouri as minister of 
education, E. Blahou as minister of foreign affairs, 
and Nikos Nikolaides as minister of the treasury (first 
names of all members of the "government in exile" were 
not given by the source of information, Atlantis). 
The purpose of the formation of the "Greek Government 
in Exile" was to form an organized resistance to the 
military dictatorship in Greece. Papandreou does not 
recognize the military junta as the legal government 
of Greece because it is not an elected government but 
one which came to power with the force of army, tanks 
and guns. 
Meanwhile, the head of the ruling junta George 
Papadopoulos, lost no time in touring Greece and 
publishing government pamphlets stating his views and 
explaining his reasons for the April 21 coup d'etat. 
Papadopoulos's campaign by tour and government 
publications sought to justify the actions the military 
had taken and played upon the fear of the people that 
the communists would have taken over if the Army had 
not interfered. In a book entitled "Our Creed" 
(~o Pistevomas), Papadopoulos published speeches made to 
the foreign press justifying his actions. The book 
includes IIhis thoughts", similar in format to those of 
Chairman Mao Tse Tung. l ? 
l?George Papadopoulos, To Pistevomas, A Greek Govern­
ment Pub1ication(Athinai: Ekdosls Genikrs-Diefthinseos 
Tipou, April 1968). 
15 
In all of his speeches to the Greek people, 
Papadopoulos sought to associat'e his coup with the 
Truman Doctrine. The main points of his talks centered 

around the idea that as the Truman Doctrine had saved 

Greece from the communists after world war II, so also 

, I did the military coup of April 21, 1967.18 It is 
, understandable why Papadopoulos had chosen this method 
of convincing the Greek people to accept his I1revolutionll. 
The Greeks continue to hold bitter and horrifying memories 
from the lIAntartopolemon", guerilla warfare, which followed 
world war II. In most parts of Greece, communism is 
synonymous with criminality. Papadopoulos then sought 
to reduce everything down to black and white. Because 
communism is a dirty word in most parts of Greece, 
Papadopoulos declared that his IIrevolution"' was a necessity 
in order to rid the imminent threat of a communist 
take-over in Greece. Anyone who was against the April 
21 coup, had to be either communist, or a communist 
sympathizer, which, of course, justified any means to 
rid the country of such people. 
In a question and answer period following a speech 

to foreign correspondents, Papadopoulos declared that 

only the communists had been rounded up and had been 

stripped of their rights as ,citizens of Greece. 19 

I 
16 
A sample of the questions and answers is as f'0110ws: 20 
(literal translation from Greek to English): 
Question: How much time do you think will be 

needed so that Greeks will be taught to act 

accordingly politically? And when will the 

Greek people be ripe for new elections? 

Answer: ~he training of the Greek people will 
be lengthy. I am not in a position to give a 
certain, date. Answering the second part of the 
question, I say that elections will take place as 
soon as possible, and as soon as the nation is 
secured, we will return to constitutional life. 
Question: You have said before that the reason 
why the "revolution" came was to stop communism. 
How do you justify the arrests of people who we 
all know never were nor are communists, such as 
Papakonstantinou, and Zigdis?
Answer: Surely in my opinion they are not 

communists. If they happened to be communists 

they are free to say it. But communists 

although they never constituted danger number­

wise, never the less have long experience in 

exploiting every human weakness. This makes it 

possible for them to even make people believe 

they are black alLhough they are white. The 

above mentioned individuals were then arrested 

in order to avoid bloodshed, as it would have 

happened if they were not~pprehended. 

In another question and answer session before 
French journalists on May 28, 1967, Papadopoulos answered 
questions concerning the revolution. An example (literal 
translation from Greek to English):2l 
Question: What are the actual changes in the 
lives of the Greek People today after the Itrevolution?" 
Answer: The answer is somehow long. Wit~ two 
words I can say that the people were redeemed from 
itself. 
20Ibid, p. 83-87.-
2li1bid , p. 40-44. 
17 
Throughout his speeches directed to the foreign 
-press and to Greek Americans, 22 Papadopoulos p'ortrayed 
himself as savior of the nation. In one 
, 
of his many 
statements Papadopoulos described the Greek:nation 
as being an ill person, in need of medical surgery.23 
Of course, the doctor happened to be the one and only 
now famous surgeon, George Papadopoulos. 
To ingrain his thoughts in the -people of Greece, 
I 
and on Greeks living abroad, George Pa-padopoulos devoted I' 
a section of a book of his public speeches to what he 
called the "Historical Extracts From the Speeches of 
the Greek President George Papadopoulou". 'J:he book I 
was published by the Greek government and has been widely I 
distributed to all Greeks. Distribution to the Greek 
oo~muriities in the United States was made by the 
Greek Orthodox Archdiocese. 
The following are a few extracts from the thoughts 
of George Papadopoulos. 24 (Literal translation from Greek 
ilo English). 
1. Communism will never have any place among 

the Greek-Christianism. 

2. The salvation of our country has more meaning

for us than the belief for regular -political future 

as long as the present situation is thought to be 

necessary to save the nation. 
2ZIbid p. 52-53.-' 
2?Ibid, p. 11. 

24-Ibid p. 163-206.
-' 
18 

3. Democracy was born here. The ideas for 
individual and social r~eedom were developed here. 
4. We are passengers in a ship to which we 
are indebted to steer in a safe course towards 
which the nation is predestined.
5. Communism is a very well organized mInority. 
6. We all are indebted to proceed together towards 
the predestination of our race. 
7. We must all become bearers of the 21st of 
April spirit. 
8. The revolution did not consider nor is consi­
dering anything else except the nation's salvation. 
9. I do not think that there is any nation in 
the world thot permits those who are insane or those 
who break the laws to circulate free in the society.
10. Greece is now marching with determination, 
with strength, and with faith in the path of her 
great predestination.
11. The population and the national government
have undertaken the crusade for the rebirth and for 
the progress of the nation. 
12. The April 21st revolution was not a movement 
by a few persons, groups, or social classes. It was 
a revolution for mutual independence.
13. It is very important sometimes that Greece 
also become well-governed, entirely of persons that 
know how to live in an organized society and not 
in a jungle.
14. The slave does not have the opportunity to 
think. He is then indebted to carry out what the 
regime thinks is proper for him to do. 
15. ~he revolution was a historical necessity.
16. we struggle to erase the pain from the 

hUJ'!an society, which is called Greece. 

1/. We must establish Greece as an example
of f~~ . rule-loving, and harmonious living
society of human beings.
18. For God's sake, we the Greeks have a heavy
inheritclTIce. It is not possible for us to have 
any kind of relationship with the tyranny of 
communism. We must protect ourselves not to 
fall prey to communistic propaganda.
19. Greece is not permited to die. We are 
obligated to keep Greece alive, we are obligated
that Greece becomes great. 
It is evident that the junta tries to justify its 
actions by portraying itself as the savior of the Greek 
Nation and by playing on the people's fears of communism. 
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The New Oonstitution 
As the work of the "revolution" moved very rapidly 
in touching all sectors of private and public life in 
Greece, a commission was appointed almost immediately 
to draw up a new constitution. The constitution p. 
1952 was set aside. 
On May 5th, 1967, the military government of 
Greece announced the reformation of the old constitu Lo ,<,n. 
The Colonels declared that a new constitution was in 
order to enable the country to meet its new "expectationsll.25 
The national government almost immediately 
proceeded to take steps to that effect. As a first 
step towards the drafting of a new constitution, the 
government leaders directed the appointment of a twenty 
member commission to make studies and recommend 
alterations to the 1952 constitution. Mr. Harilaos 
Mitrelias, ~resident of the State Council, was named 
chairman. 26 
The commission proceeded to work on its assigned 
task, and on December 23, 1967, it presented to the 
25Study Of The New Constitution, A Greek Government 
Publica'tion (Athens: Ministry To 'rhe Prime Minister, Press 
And Information Department, Foreign Press Division, 1968), 
p. 2. 
26George Papadopoulos, To Pistevomas,A Greek Government 
Publication (Athinai: Ekdos:LS Genikis Diefthinseos 
Tipou, April 1968), p. 99-102. 
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national government a draft of the new constitution. 
After the draft was studied by the national government, 
it was released for publication on Marcn 15, 1968, to 
enable the people to "contribute to it" before it was 
presented to them for approval. 27 
The terminationcdate for public debate was May 
31, 1<968. During the two and a half months "studyll 
period the government claimed that it received: 
More than five million post cards,--making

it possible to sound the views of the public

opinion and thus facilitating the National 

Government in its intention to provide the 

country with a new Constitution meeting

the wishes and the will of the Greek people. 28 

FollQwing a review of the recommendations made by 
the Metrelias Commission and supposedly by the Greek 
people, the National Government leaders, after long 
discussion with other members of the government, drew the 
final draft of the new constitution and then released 
it for publication during the first half of July 1968. 29 
From July to the election, the leaders of the 
IIrevolutionary" government worked feverishly and tirelessly 
to set the mood, to convince the Greek people to vote 
27Studt Of The New Constitution, A Greek Government 
Publication Athens:-Ministry To The ~rime Minister, 
Press And Information Department, Foreign Press Division, 
1968), p. 2-3. 
28Ibid p. 3.-' 

29Ibid t p. 3. 
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"yes" on the newly formed constitution. According to 
several Greek friends who were in Greece during that 
period, the leaders of the "revolutionery government ll 
led a massive campaign of IINai" (Yes) votes for the 
new constitution. fhey covered all naked walls with 
"Nai" posters, and opposition to their campaign \, .S 
prohibited. 
According to a number of sources, governmen~ 
leaders used the clergy in the campaign to give 
legitimacy to the government's acts. ~he government's 
main slogan was said to be "Greece for Greek Christians". 
Reportedly priests were compelled to accompany 
members of the government campaigning for the new 
constitution. It is understandable why the regime 
chose, this campaign method in trying to convince the 
Greek people to accept the new constitution.' Historically, 
it is the clergy that always has provided leadership to 
the Greek people in times of despair •. It was the clergy 
that kept alive in every Greek the fire of patriotism 
during the Turkish occupation, and it was the clergy 
that first raised the Greek flag in 1821 and called on 
the Greek population to rise up against the Turks. 
Even today the leadership of Ithe clergy is valued and 
is respected as much as it w1s in the past. A ready 
example is the Archbishop oflCyprus, Makarios, who 
I 
with his traditional leadersiip united the Oypriots, 
I 
I 
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led them in their fight for independence from Britain, 
and was ultimately elected President of Cyprus. 
Despite the advantages accruing from the lack of 
any organized opposition to its campaign for the new 
constitution, the Greek military government took no 
chances. As reported by the Associated Press in Athens: 
The Greek regime ordered military and 
police units on alert Baturday and issued 
a last-minute appeal for a massive "Yes lt 
vote in 3unday's Constitutional referendum. 
Foreign Minister Panayiotis Pipinelis
pleaded for other countries to help the 
regime by easing opposition. He insisted 
that despite the existence of martial 
law, lithe referendum is free, without 
any pressure the people can vote according 
to their conscience." All open opposition, 
however, was forbidden. Boldiers and police 
stood by to quell any possible demonstrotiun 
of dissent. Extra buses, trains, and ships 
were laid on in a final stepped-up effort to 
get all eligible voters back to their homes 
in time to cast ballots. Few Greeks had any 
doubt about the outcome should the constitution 
be turned down. Deputy Premier Spylianos
Patakos said Friday that in event of a 
rejection: "VJe vJould be obliged to draft 
a new constitution, ~Bt under conditions 
of more discipline". 
The following account of what went on during the 
Constitutional referendum was given by several Greek 
friends who were living in Greece at the time. 
On Sunday, September 2'j, 1968, the Cl.tl.es 
were crowded with armed police and military 
units. Some of them were stationed as guards 
in poll places and major intersections, and 
30nGreek Regime Urges Constitution Passage", The 
Sunday Oregonian, September 29, 1968, Section I, p.~ 
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others were' used to patrol the cities. Battle 
ready soldiers were searching house to house 
looking for people who did not go to the polls.
One of my friends told me that during the day 
of the referendum, several soldiers broke 
into the hou!.::le of his parents. They f'ound his 
mother baking bread, and forced her at gunpoint,
and without allowing her to change into a 
different dress or wash off her flour-covered 
hands to go to the polls and vote on the new i 
Constitution. I was told that most of the 
Greeks voted at gun-point, surrounded by
military and police units. Another difficulty
which the Greek people had in express~ng their 
i:approval or disapproval, and vote according to I' 
I 
their conscience was the way that the ballots 
were made up. According to my Greek friends, 
the "Yes" ballots were in blue color, and the 
"No" ballots were in red. I was told that if 
someone picked the "No" ballot which was colored 
reti, he was automati~ally admitting that he was 
a "Red" or a communist. 
It is clear from the above that the Greek people 
not only did not have a "yes" or "no" choice, they were 
also denied the right to remain away from the polls. 
As was expected, the Greek people overwhelmingly 
approved the new constitution. The result as reported 
!
by the govc;,rnment was as follows: 31 
1. Registered voters: 6,516,285 
2. Voted: 5,048,981
3. Valid ballots: 5,030,466 
4. Invalid ballots: 18,515
5. "Yes" votes for the new Constitution: 4,638,543 
6. "No" votes against the new Constitution: 391,423 
Of course, the results were only what the regime 
chose to let the public know. 
31"Complete results on the Constitutional Referendum, 
Sunday April 29," "Atlantis, LXXV (October 6, 1968), p. 1. 
,; ,'Ii 
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On November 8, 1968, the results of the referendum 
were approved by the Greek Supreme Oourt: 32 
The Greek Supreme 00urt Friday ratified the 
results of the Sept. 29 referendum in which 
Greek voters approved the new constitution put
before them by the military dictatorsbip. The 
court's approval paved the WDy for the 
constitution to go into effect on ounday when 
it is publislled in the government gazette. Not 
all of the 138 articles become effective imme­
diately. Ten dealing with press and individual 
freedom,remain temporarily suspended. The new 
charter replaces a constitution approved by the 
Greek Parliament in 1952. 
Part of Article 138 of the new constitution 
provides that the regime can delay any individual 
rights until it has enough time to complete the aims 
of the revolutibn; the regime can rule by decree on any 
matter. 33 
The new constitution establishes Greece as a 
crowned democracy, strips the King of most of the powers 
given to him under the 1952 constitution, and increases 
the power and authority of the Executive. Moreover, it 
establishes the Greek armed forces as the defender of the 
new political and social system. 
A partial summary of the 1968 constitution is as 
3'2nOourt Backs Greek Vote", The Oregonian, 
November 10, 1968, Section 1, p. 4. 
33Shedion Tou Neou 
Greek Governmen u 
Simvoulion, 1968). 
/ 
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.tollows: 34 (literal translation from Greek to English). 
1. Article 2. All powers are derived from the 
people. The people are the source of all 
authority. The King has no prerogatives nor 
powers except those which are explicitly given 
to him by the Constitution. 
2. Article 14. Yellow press which contributes 
to the destruction of morols, democracy, and 
deviates from the true mission of the press is 
punished. After the second offence within five 
years, the court shall order the suspension of 
the publication temporarily, or permanently.
3. Article 42. The King will rule only
through the elected and responsible representatives
of the people. No act of the King shall be 
valid nor will it be carried out unless it is 
also countersigned by a competent minister, 
also alone by his signature assumes responsibility
for such an act. 
4. Article 46. Only by the consent of the 
notional council may the King dissolve the 
Parliament. The King has no legislative power
according to the new constitution. He only
issues and promulgates the laws. 
5. Article 48. The executive has the power 
not only to publish executive decrees, he also 
has the power to regulate decrees of legislative 
content, provided he has authorization from the 
chamber of deputies. During emergencies or in 
urgent situations, the executive has also 
legislative powers by decrees, which become 
acts of law. 
6. Article 54. This article creates the 
National Council, and its major functions are 
as follows: 
1. It will assist the King to make 
right decisions on important matters. 
2. Will assist in apPoiriting the 
Prime Minister when not nominated by
the Parliament because of a deadlock 
over such nomination. 
3. Will assist in dissolving Parliament. 
7. Article 57. The members of Parliament are 
reduced from the original number of 300, to a 
maximum of 150. Also at least one sixth of the 
members of?Parliament must be elected by the 
. 
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entire body of voters, which constitutes 
the whole nation. This is done to avoid 
Ithe dependency of candidates upon local 
i Iand personal ties. The constitutional court I iII,'ihas the power to choose between 25-30 
members of Parliament. (By this method, :1 
the court can deny the majority to any party 
it chooses). 
8. Article 58. Political party leadership
will no longer oe personal or a family affair. 
Political party leaders shall be popularly
elected in local and national conventions. 
Political parties shall be required to 
maintain records of their incomes and 
expenses. All kinds of contributions must 
be listed by name, and each year during
the month of February such party must 
publish its financial statements. The 
Constitutional Court shall decide if a party 
is legal upon sUbmission of its charter to the 
Court. (The Court by this has the power of 
granting permission for the formation of a 
party) • 
9. Article 88. No member of Parliament 
may be-appointed at a cvbinet of the government,
with the exception of the Prime Minister, and 
the deputy prime ministers. Even if a member 
of Parliament resigns his parliamentary seat, 
he cannot be aDpointed to any governmental 
position. (Members of ~arliament were 
appointed to governmental positions under the 
1952 constitu~ion).
10. Article 89-92. The Prime Minis~er shall 
make all general policy, and shall supeJ:"vise to 
the application of the laws. The deputy ministers 
shall assist the Prime Minister. Undersecretaries 
shall be held personally pesponsible for carrying 
out the duties which fall within their juris~iction.
11. Article 106. With this article, the 
Constitutional Court was created. The major
functions of the Constitutional Court are; 
Articles 61-63-65. 
1. To declare on the validity of 

provisions and laws. 

2. To approve charts of political

parties and dissolve such parties if they 

are found to work against the laws of the 

land, and against democracy.

3. To investigate elections, and rule on 

their validity. 

I I, 
I 
I 
; I 
I 
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I12. Article 112. No civilians may come under I 
the jurisdiction of military courts, naval courts, 
and airforce courts except for criminal offences 
against the security of the armed forces. 
13. Article 124. The Armed Forces have the 

respons'!bility of defending the existing social 

and political system against any "insidious attempt".

14. Article 127. At the beginning of each 

session, the Parliament will elect by a two-thirds 

majority a commissioner to assist in the Parliamentary

control. (This is modeled after the Swedish 

Ombudsman).

15. Article 129. Although for historical reasons 
the King is the leader of the armed forces, the 

administration and command of such forces will be 

exercised by the elected civilian government

through the chief of staff. 
16. Article 138. This article upon the 

signature of the Prime Minister becomes effective, 

with the exception of the articles which permit

the basic freedoms. (Article 138 in effect 

postpones promises of free assembly, free strikes, 

free press, and free political parties until the 

military regime decides to permit such freedoms. 

What the people voted then on September 29, 1968, 

was a promise for their freedom some day

whenever that may be). 

In short, Greece today is ruled by a military 
dictatorship in the person of George Papadopoulos. Greek 
citizens have no civil rights except what Papadopoulos 
decides to hand out to them on a day-to-day basi~. 
• r 
OHAPTER III 
HOW IT WAS BEFORE APRIL 21" 1967 
A' brief background of Modern Greek Politics. 
Since Greece freed herself from Turkish rule in 
1821, she has been dominated by her allies (Britain ~nd 
the United States) and treated primarily as an essential 
strategic Mediterranean base at the expense of her 
, 
national sovereignty. 
Modern Greek politics has its beginning when 
the Greeks accepted Othon as their King. This was 
accomplished through the efforts of the Triple Alliance 
and the influence of Great Britain. Othon was the son 
of Ludwig, King of Bavaria. Early in 1833 he was 
delivered to Greece aboard a British warship.35 
When Othon abdicated some twenty-nine years later, 
the British again intervened to insure that Greece 
would remain a monarchy. This time a member of the 
Glucksburg family, and an ancestor of King Oonstantine, 
was installed on the throne. 
,I, 
I 
I'I 
I 
I 
Since Greece's independence in 1821, Greek 
politics has been oriented to the Great Idea (Megaloidea) 
35H.A. Lidderdale, IVlakritannis: The Memoirs of 
General Makriyannis 1797-1864 London: OXford university 
Press, Ely House, 1966), p. 149. 
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that the Greeks re-establish the empire of ancient 
Byzantium. As a result of the Great Idea, a series 
of wars with the Turks ensued to establish a I'Greater 
Greece l1 • 
To finance such wars, Greece was forced to borrow 
large sums of foreign capital especially from the British, 
'and as Greece's debts to Britain grew, British dominance, 
over Greek foreign and domestic policy was achieved. 
On the economic side, the British achieved ownership of 
all public utilities, mining of all sorts, transportation, 
and valuable pieces of real estate in all parts of Greece. 
IV1ajor portions of the entire Greek economy were controlled 
I'I 
by the British. As 'a result, and also because the "wars" 
failed to achieve a Grea,ter Greece, a series of plots and 
coups occured.;6 
;6Stephen Rousseas, The Death of • Democracy~ Greece 
and the American Conscience (New York: Grove Press, Inc.,
J967), p. 73-14. 
It is sometimes maintained that plots and coups are 
part of the Greek character and will occur whether or not 
foreign powers intervene in Greek internal affairs. The 
author however, does not accept this assumption. He views 
the main causes for the political instability in Greece as 
follows: 1) the King has always been looked upon by the 
republican forces as being ,an instrument of foreign powers
who govern Greece through him; 2) the King is a non-Greek 
who was installed in Greece by ',foreign powers, who have in 
many instances intervened to keep him in power or to return 
him from a forced exile; ;) since the King owes his position
and, power to the support of foreign powers, he feels no 
obligation towards the Greek people'nor is he sympathetic·
'to their problems, but instead constantly works on a 
"divide and conquer" policy towards Greek political leaders. 
Since Greece has never been left alone to manage 
her affairs, it is not known whether she would be 
politically more stable without foreign intervention. 
II 
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As the Monarchy sought to gain strength, it openly 
al'gned itself with the military. This alliance brought 
public oppostition to the Monarchy and, subsequently, the 
exile of King George II on two separate occasions prior 
to the outbreak of the Second World War. During the 
King's periods of exile, the republican forces sought to 
. strengthen their power within the Greek armed forces, 
but their attempts failed. The reason for the failure 
to gain any power within the armed forces was that high­
ranking republican officers were purged by the well­
entrenched royalist officers who, through the support 
of the Allies, always held all key positions within the 
Greek armed forces •. As a result of the republican 
failure to gain strength within the Greek armed forces, 
King George II was returned to Greece from his second 
exile after a rigged plebiscite in his favor gave him 
ninety-seven per cent of the votes in 1935. 37 
Following his return to Greece, King George II 
installed John Metaxas, a right-wing General of the Greek 
Army,' as prime minister. On the pretence that Greece was 
in danger of being overtaken by communists, Metaxas (evidently 
with the King's approval) staged a coup which not only 
eliminated all open opposition to the King, but also ended 
constitutional government in Gre.ece. Following the coup, 
37Ibid, p. 74. 
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IMetaxas lost no time in exiling (during this period 
I 
, :Andreas Papandreou, a young university student, was 
. 1 
i I: 
exiled to the United States) or placing under arrest 
all political oppostition. He also dissolved parliament 
and established a government similar in sUbstance and 
form to that of Hitler's.38 
Henceforth, until the time of his death in January 
29, 1941, Metaxas ruled the Country with an iron hand. 
Although ',the Greek people were dissatisfied 
with the Metaxa's dictatorship, they arose spontaneously 
and expelled the Italian invading forces from Greek soil. 
About this time, however, Metaxas died and the Germans 
came to the aid of their retreating allies, the Itali.ns. 
Several months after the German assault, the Greek armed 
forces were defeated, and the Oountry fell under German 
occupation. 
During the period of German control, high ranking 
political and military leaders in the Greek government 
collaborated with the invaders and were later recognized 
by the German occupation forces as the legitimate 
government of Greece as a reward.39 The occupation of 
38Ibid p. 74.-' 
39w.A. Heurtley, H.O. Darby, O.W. Orawley and 
O,..M•. Woodhouse, A Short History of Greece (New York: 
Bentley House, 1967), p. 145. 
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Greece by Germany forced King George II to go into 

exile for the third time. He took his political friends 

with him and made them members of his Greek government 

in exile. Metaxas's machine, however, continued to 

operate for the duration of the German occupation under 

.the different II quisling" regimes. During this period, 
various resistance groups sprang up in all parts of the 
country. The strongest one was led bJ the communists and 
was initially aided by the British. However, this resistance 
group lost British support in 1943. The British shifted 
their aid to the monarchy-oriented guerillas, as Britain 
wished to insure the return of King George II to the Greek 
throne. Evidently the British wanted to make certain that 
their dominance in Greece after the war would not be 
diminished nor threatened by the left of the republican 
forces. 40 
Although the King's government in exile (this 

government was appointed at the will of the King and 

represented only his views) was in constant communication 

with the resistance forces, it failed to appreciate and 

heed the strength of anti-monar~hical feeling developing 

in occupied Greece~ It continued to act as if the 
Greek people supported its dealings with other 
40Stephen Rousseas, The 
and the American Conscienc~e~~~~~~~~~~~~~~n~c~.-,~ 
1967), p. 75. 
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governments. 41 It made such agreements as that which 
surrenderdthe Greek forces under British Command, and 
that with the United States providing for Lend-Lease 
supplies. 
Meanwhile, those in the resistance movement inside 
Greece, primarily led by communist and venizelist elements 
(the venizelist movement was named after Eleftherios 
Venizelos, a republican who served as prime minister of 
Greece from 1910 to 1920), made an agreement that after 
the war they would oppose the return of the King. 42 The 
principal supporters of the King's return to Greece were 
the King's government in exile, the British, and the 
collaborators inside Greece. The British government 
supported the King and his government in exile as the 
legitimate rulers of Greece, but, because they also 
needed the support of the resistance forces inside Greece, 
43they did not force the issue at the time. 
In July 1943, the King under British pressure 
promised a "fully representative" government after Greece's 
liberation, to be followed by elections for a constitutional 
sssemo, 1 y Wl. th . . ths. 44 F 11oWlng th . s t t emen.ln SlX mon, 0 1S a t 
on abortive mutiny attempt within the Greek forces in Egypt 
4:1W.A. Heurtley, H.C. Darby, O.i,V. Orawley and C.l"l. 
Woodhouse, A Short History of Greece (New York: Bentley House, 
1967), p. 147. 
42Ibid , p. 145. 
43Ibid, p. 146. 
44Ibid , p. 150. 
I 
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occured. (The mutiny was led by anti-monarchists and was 
rapidly supressed by British forces). This was followed 
by the resignations of several of the King's governments 
in succession. Since the King solely appointed his 
governments in exile, each time there was disagreement 
with the King's policies the leaders of such governments 
had no alternative but to resign. 
Meantime, George Papandreou escaped from Greece 
in the middle of 1943 and was asked by the King to form 
a government. Upon his acceptance, Papandreou decided 
to call a conference in Lebanon to form a government of 
national unity, with the leaders of the resistance 
participating. The leaders of the resistance force 
reluctantly agreed to Papandreou's proposal and finally 
joined his government. The agreement between Papandreou 
and the resistance forces allowed the Allies to take over 
Greece without bloodshed, and Papandreou's government 
of national unity (formed in exile with leaders of the 
guerilla force participating) became the first government 
in liberated Greece as the GermanFl withdrew til'jthe 
north in October 1944.45 
In November of 1944, General Scobie, the British 
Commander in Greece, ordered the dissolution of the guerilla 
forces. As a result of this order relations among members 
45Ibidt p. 150. 
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of the Greek government (government of national unity) 
began to deteriorate. The communist and other ministers 
representing the guerilla faction left the government. 
The leaders of the guerilla forces refused to disband. 
The withdrawal of the guerilla faction from the government 
was followed by an outbreak of violence between the 
Greek and the British authorities on the one side, and 
the guerilla forces on the other. The fighting was so 
fierce that the British were forced to bring in large 
reinforcements from Italy. Meantime, negotiations were 
initiated between the British and the guerillas. A truce 
was achieved. The guerillas were to lay down their arms, 
and the government was expected to make liberal reforms. 
Amnesty for political crimes and a plebiscite on the question 
of the Monarchy to be held under international supervision 
were promised.46 When the results of the truce did not 
materialize, things began to deteriorate again. By this 
time however, the British had thrown all of their support 
behind the right-wing royalist group. British concern 
over Greek affairs was observed by William Hardy McNeil, 
a postwar U.S. Assistant Military Attache in Athens: 47 . 
46Ibid , p. 151. 
47Stephen Rousseas, The Death of a Democracy-Greece 

and the American Conscience (New York:. Grove Press, Inc.,

1967), p. 77-78. 
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Irheir first and principal concern was that the 
government of Greece should always be friendly
towards them; and the men who shaped British 
policy for Greece were by this time firmly 
convinced that an EAM (Left) government would 
not be friendly. Exactly whbt "friendly" meant 
was not clear. Probably it meant in part 
the re-establishment of economic concessions 
to British-owned public utility and other 
companies; but in the last anolysis, and far 
more important, it meant a government in Greece 
that would side with Great Britain in case 
of another war. 
Apparently the British were not concerned about 
what the interests of the Greek people were, but only 
what best served British interest. Even though the right 
wing royalist faction enjoyed little support from the 
people, the British supported it. 
Under the terms of an agreement(see pp. 34-35 and 
footnote no. 46) between the Greek and British governments 
on the one hand and the guerillas on the other~ the 
resistance forces layed down their arms and disbanded. 
On the other hand, the rif,htist faction with the assistance 
of the British troops spread into all parts of Greece, 
taking retributions on their political opponents. (This 
was in violation of an earlier promise by the British 
and Greek governments of political amnesty for all). 
The activity of the right was so disruptive that 
Clement Attlee, the British Prime Minister, cabled the 
Greek Regent(the Primate of Greece was designated by the 
Greek government as regent of Greece until the King's 
37 
return in September 1946) in August, 1945, that he was 
"disquited at the information of new excesses on the 
part of the Right".48 
Long after the resistance forces Bad layed dawn 
their arms and dissolved their forces, the Greek 
government depended upon British troops to maintain 
control over the country. This, of course, assured 
the British of the return of their prewar capital 
concessions, including control over Greek public 
utilities. As one American official in Greece at that 
time stated: 49 "Greece had become a client state of the 
British, who had effectively limited (one might say 
terminated) the sovereignty of the Greek government". 
From the time the Left put down its arms, in 
February 1945, to the time of the election in March of 
1946, 
an estimated 85,000 Greeks were arrested 

and 1,300 killed. Neither the police nor the 

gendarmerie were purged of wartime 

collaborators •••Efforts of the Prime Minister 

to limit royalist control of the army were 

blocked by the British Military Mission, which 

accused him of trying to play politics with 

the army, and by General Scobie and the British 

Ambassador. Control of Greece's air force and 

n~vy.was i8 the hands of other special British 

m~ss~ons.' 

48Ibid--' p. 80. 

49Ib~;!, p. 81. 

50Ibid, p •. 80. 
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As was expected, the government that emerged from 
the March, 1946, elections was, controlled by the royalist 
forces. The date for the plebiscite on the question of 
the King's return to Greece was set for September, 1946. 
The plebiscite was held as scheduled, (the vote was 
approximately eighty-one per cent for the return of the 
King) and on the twenty-eight of the same month King 
George II arrived in Greece.51 With the King's arrival, 
guerilla activity agaanst the royalist forces increased. !, 
In December, 1946, the government brought charges at the 
United Nations Security Council that Yugoslavia, Bulga~ia 
and Albania were supporting guerilla activity and therefore 
threatening Greece's internal security.52 
To investigate Greece's charges, the U.N. decided 
to send a commission to Greece to gather additional 
information on the spot. Following the commission's 
on-the-spot investigation and on the basis of its report, 
the U.N. General Assembly condemned Yugoslavia, 
Bulgaria and Albenia for aiding the guerillas in Greece.' 
In March, 1947, King George II died, his youngest 
brother Paul succeeded him to the throne, and the British 
51w.A. Heurtley, H.C. Darby, C.W. Orawley and O~M. 
Woodhouse, it Short History of Greece (New York: Bentley 
House, 196 r?J,p. 154-155. 
52Stepehn Rousseas, The
and the american Oonscienc=e~~~~~~~~~~~~--~n~c~.-,~
T9b?j,-p. S3';-----' 
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Ambassador in Washington informed the U.S. that because 
of economic difficulties, Britain was forced to tterminate 
her involvement in Greece. The announcement by the 
Sritish Ambassador brought an end to the British economic 
and political dominance over Greece that had lasted for 
more than one hundred years and ushered in a like dominance 
by the United States through what is known today as the 
Truman Doctrine of March 12, 1947. 53 
The Truman Doctrine, of course, was hailed by the 
"right", for without British or American assistance 
it could not have remained in power for long. AS was the 
case with the British, the U.S. also decided to throw 
all of its support behind the rightist elements and all 
of its might against the leftist guerillas. Although 
guerilla warfare continued until late in 1949, the 
guerillas were finally defeated militarily. They could 
no longer withstand the far superior American military 
might that had been thrust against them since 1947. 
Following the end of the guerilla warfare, the U.S. 
tried to set up a representative government in Greece 
to reconstruct the country economically. However, this 
was not an easy task. The main problems the United States 
encDuntered in its self-assigned task were as follows: 54 
53Ibid p. 8;.---' 

54Ibid p. 84-98.
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Governments were falling faster than they were formed, 
corruption was running high in governmental circles 
(the machinery of government had not basically changed 
since Greece had won its independence from the Turks), 
and inflation was increasing steadily. 
Although political instability had been a~ajor 
part of Greek political life since Greece's independence, 
the Right (with initially British and later American 
military and economic support) not only managed to control 
the formation of every government that came into existence 
over the years, it also made all decisions concerning the 
appointments of top military and governmental personnel. 
However, with the formation of the CUP in 1961 ( the new 
party was a coalition of all political parties except the 
ERE and EDA), things began to change. 
In the 1963 elections the CUP emerged as the major 
party in Greece. 55 Because none of the parties received 
an absolute ~majority of the popular vote, new elections 
were scheduled. On the second election in February 16, 1964, 
the CUP won an absolute majority.56 (Fifty-three per cent). 
For the first time, the Right found itself in the 
unusual position of being clearly in the elected minority. 
Up to 1964-1965, the Right maintained full control 
55Ibid, p. 21. 

56Ibid, p. 22. 
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over the government machinery. 'J:he police ,the army, 
the rural gendarmerie and the bureaucracy in general 
were controlled and staffed with "their own" people. 
It is fair to say that Greece was the only nation on the 
side of the Allies in which the Nazi collaborators were 
not purged from their governmental positions at the end 
of the war. 57 
Although the Right was defeated in the polls for 
the first time since Greece's independence in 1821, 
the Palace, the Righ~ and the Army did not appear 
greately concerned, as they still had absolute control of 
the bureaucracy and the security forces. In other words, 
they were still in full control of the "sub-level 
governments" where the real power was. On top of this, 
Papandreou, wanting to please the Palace, appointed as 
Defense Minister Petros Garoufalias, a stanch Palace 
supporter, and made other pro-royalist appointments to his 
goverrimen:b as well. 58 
Greek affairs appeared to have stabilized, until the 
Cyprus crisis exploded in 1966. The Cyprus problem brought 
abdut a rapid deterioration in the relations between Greece 
and Turkey (both members oft.;he NATO Allience) which 
57Ibid , p. 19. 

58Ibid, p. 24. 
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threatened. NATO's southeastern flank. At this point, 
Washington became alarmed, and began pressuring Greece 
to resolve its difference (for example, the U.S. 
suggested that Cyprus be partitioned between the Greek 
and the Turkish communities) with Turkey according to 
Washington's dictates. Papandreou however, refused to ad.t 
like a good satelite and decided to take an independent 
stand on what he thought were Greece's national interests. 
As if Papandreou had not already gone far enough by 
disobeying th(:) wishes of \vashington, his government 
added more fuel to the fire by publicly stat~ng that 
"it would welcome Soviet assistance in preparation for 
a possible war with Turkey". This prompted the U.s.. 
Embassy to demand an lexplanation".59 MoreoVier, 
Papandreou threatened to remove the extreme right-wing 
officers from the army's high command.60 From this 
point, Papandreou's government began to rapidly skid 
towards the confrontation that took place on April 21, 1967. 
Meanwhile, Papandreou's behavior and public 
statements began to alarm the "Right". At the end of 
1966 Papandreou was informed by "a wealthy Greek ship­
owner", who '''had a conversation with his good friend 
59Ibid, p. 32. 

60Ibid p. 32.
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John McCone, director of the CIA", that: Q1 
Major elements of the right-wing General 
staff had began to doubt the patriotic II 
:1motives of the Center Union government 
and were beginning to discuss a coup d'etat I 
shoul~ the government continue to pursue I, 
its liberal policies. I 
II 
II 
Upon receiving the above information (the informant 
is not known to the author), George Papandreou called a 
secret meeting of his inner cabinet to discuss the 
I 
I 

I 

I 
i 
II 
II 
gradual replacement of the Army's General citaff. II 
II 
Garoufalias (the Defense Minister and stanch supporter 
of the Palace) reported immediately to the King what 
was discussed during this secret inner cabinet meeting. 
The King informed Papandreou that he would strongly 
oppose any change in the High Comrnand·of the Greek Army. 
The reaction of Papandreou and the cabinet was that 
Garoufalias had to be replaced. However, the attempt 
to remove Garoufalias from office was blocked by the 
King. The struggle between Constantine and Papandreou 
resulted finally in the army's take over on April 21, 1967. 
The following section of this chapter will be 
devoted to a more thorough account of the events that took 
place from 1964 (the year that the Center Union came to 
power), to 1967, when martial law was substituted for 
61Ibid-' 
p. 29. 
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Parliamentary goveDnment in Greece. 
What happened from 1964 to 1967. 
When George Papandreou, a man of liberal ideas and 
very anti-royalist, was elected premier in 1964, the 
stage was set for a political showdown between the royal 
palace and the Papandreouses. It was no more than a 
few months after his election that Papandreou found 
himself in a political turmoil in his attempt to 
exercise his duties as head of the Greek government. 
A summary of the situation in Greece from 1964 
to 1967 is given in the following: 62 
George Papandreou was voted into power in 
1964 as the head of the Union of the Center Pariy 
He was joined by his son Andreas, an American 
citizen and professor of economics at the 
University of California who had returned to 
Greece in charge of a recovery mission subsidized 
by the Ford and Rockefeller foundations. The 
eldest Papandreou made his son, still an 
American citizen, the alternate minister of 
coordination. George Papandreou started transfering 
key officers and rightist appointees from the 
Central Intelligence Service and the army high
command to points as far removed as possible from 
the Athens area. This move would have excited 
suspicion immediately had it not been for the 
formation-then in progress-of an army contingent
for duty on Cyprus. The influx of rightist 
officers into Cyprus pleased General George Grivas, 
who is in charge of the army's Cyprus operation, 
but displeased Archbishop Makarios, the President 
of Cyprus, who was looking to Cypriot Communists and 
the Soviet block for support. At the prompting
of his son, the senior Papandreou then reversed 
his policy and began sending leftist officers to 
Cyprus-among them members of the small Aspida 
62George Bailey, "The Puritan revolt in Greece~.l!llL 
Reporter, ~ay 18, 1geZ), p. 19-21. 
<. 
• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 
45 
(Shield) organization, whose aim was the overthrow 
of the Monarchy and the severing of Greece's military
alliance with the West. This pleased Makarios 
but displeased Grivas, who subsequently exposed the 
Aspida conspiracy and implicated Andreas as 
its leader. 
The administrative investigation that followed 
.1 IGriva's expose implicated twenty-eight officers, 
including the deputy chief of intelligence and 
the chief of intelligence on Cyprus. The young 
new King, Constantine II, interceded and demanded 
a full-scale judid~al investigation; ••• 
Papandreou refused to mount the investigation.
When the King turned directly to the Minister of 
Defense and the investigation proceeded, Papandreou
dismissed the minister, who thereupon refused to 
resign without a writ of dismissal signed by the' 
King. The King in turn refused to sign until 
a replacement was named. To his astonishment 
Papandreou named himself. The King refused to 
accept this, pointing out that he could not allow 
Papandreou to preside .over an investigation of a 
conspiracy in which his own son was implicated.
Thereupon Papandreou announced that he would 
resign within twenty-four hours. Fearing that 
Papandreou would use the twenty-four hours to 
dissolve Parliament and call for new elections or 
set an Aspida military coup in motion, the King 
demanded that Papandreou resign then and there. 
When Papandreou refused, the King aPiointed a new 
Premier from the ranks of Papandreou s own party the 
same night.
George Papandreou reacted to his ouster by taking 
to the streets and attacking the King point-blank 
on the issue of monarchy versus republicanism. "Who 
rules Greece?" he asked, "The King or the people?"
In the turmoil that ensued, just enough members 
of Papandreou's Center Union defected to allow the 
conser~ative National Radical Union to govern in 
coalition with the small Progressive Party and the 
Center Union defectors. 
After fifteen precarious months the coalition 
E;overnment fell in December, 19b6, when the 
Conservatives refused to support a new electoral 
·law providing for proportional representation, a 
system that would have favored the smaller and 
splinter parties.
One more caretaker government under Ioanis 
Paraskevopoulos was brought down on the issue of 
Andreas Papan~reou's parliamentary immu~ity. In 
46 
March of this year an Athenian court had found 
Ififteen dfficers guilty of plotting against the 

state and the monarchy in the Aspida conspiracy 

trial. In accordance with the findings of the 

court, the public prosecutor prepared charges of 

high treason against Andreas Papandreou. 

The prosecutor made application to Parliament 

for the lifting of immunity of Andreas and 

another deputy. while this was being considered, 

Geor;~;e Papandreou' s Center Union proposed an 

amendment to the election law to extend the legal

immunity of members after the dissolution of 

Parliament. 

King Constantine then tried to arrange for the 

formation of a grand coalition between the 

National Radical Union and the Center Union to 

prepare the elections but; was rebuffed by his 

long-confirmed enemy, George Papandreou. 

The King's subsequent appointment of Pan,yotis

Kanelopoulos of the National Radical Union as 

Premier drove the two Papandreous to a new pitch 

of fury, the senior announcing that Constantine 

was no longer liKing of Grf::'ece but King of the 

National Radical Union," and the junior advising

the King publicly to choose a pleasant spot for 

his exile. 

When Kanelopoulos dissolved Parliament on 

April 14 and called for elections on May 28 without 

bothering to put the issue to a vote, his action 

was almost universally accepted as the last storm 

signal. 

Another account as given by Ramparts Magazine: 63 
It had been rumored that the King and the U.S. 
had a longstanding deal: !lyou help me keep my throne, 
and I'll keep Greece in NATO for you 11. (NATO, of course, 
is the key to American interest in Greek politics).
The King was threatened by the P~pandreous--especially 
young, popular Andreas. Certainly Andreas would 
replace his aging father as Prime Minister if the 
Papandreou,s' popular Center Union Party won the 
nation0l elections set for May 28th. Andreas was out 
to eradicate the political and economic oligarchy of which 
63Stanle~ K. Sheinbaum, "Prelude", Ramparts, VI 
(October, 19674 p. 43. 
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the monarchy was an integral port, for which the 
monarchy relied on the military, for which the 
military relied on the U.S •. -all for NA'ro • ••• 
As early as 1964, when Andreas' charismatic 
leadership became evident, the plot against him 
was set in motion • ••• 
So, when the May 28th elections drew near and 
Andreas Papandreou's popularity remained strong,
it became apparent that he had to be cut off. 
A coup was therefore in the making. A propaganda 
base had been laid: Andreas was a pro-communist;
he might take Greece out of NATO. U.S. officialdom 
was prepared for Andreas to go • •••· . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
But with all that ground work laid, the "official ll 
coup got couped: An even more irresponsible group
of military made their move first, and today Greece 
is not in the hands of an anti-democratic King with 
U.S. support, but rather a radical fascist cliqu~. 
Additional testimony is given by Andreas Vachliotis 
and Kyriakos Diakogiannis, to Stanley Sheinbaum a 
journalist for Rampart~ magazine. Vachliotis and 
Diakogiannis claim that they were threatened and forced 
by the Greek OIA to fabricate evidence against Andreas 
Papandreou. 
The testimony of Andreas Vachliotis follows: 64 
This story begins in Paris in June 1964, where 
I was spending my vacation. Andreas Papandreou
had just become Minister of Ooordination (the
highest-ranking post in the Greek government after 
the Prime Minister) in the cabinet of his father, 
Prime Minister George Papandreou • • 0. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Andreas Papandreou, having spent 20 years as an 
economics professor at American Universities was 
. 64Andreas Vach1iotis "The Testimony of Andreas 
Vachliotis", Ramparts, VI ~October, 1967), p. lJ.4-46. 
(Ii . 
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totally naive about the intricacies of Greek 

Politics. He is a staunch democrat, a 

respected economist and an honest man, but 

because of his political inexperience, I was 

very much afraid of the maneuvers other Greek 

politicians were plotting behind his back • ••• 

remained in Paris, but Andreas returned to Greece. 
He asked me to put some of my ideas into writing, and 

during the month·i~ July, I wrote him a number of 

memoranda. 

It was one of these memoranda which was later used 

as a pretext for putting Papandreou in jail • •••
· . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
It was seven typed pa 
~ 
;: on yellowish paper, and it 
is now in the hands of the Greek judicial authorities. 
What this memorandum basically said was that 
Paparldreou, to protect himself and establish his 
father's government fully in control, should undertake 
"the creation of an organization to control the 
mechanism of the Greek state, both inside and outside 
the country", to preempt control from agents of the 
fascist-leaning military and secret police. I further 
recommended, in that proposal, the "gradual replacement ll 
of the military chiefs of staff, as well as the heads 
of the police, gendarmerie, and the multitude of 
secret police organizations, including KYP which, from 
all evidence, were actively engaged in undermining
Papandreou's government • •••· . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
There was not the 
~ 
faintest suggestion, either in my
proposals or in any of my talks with Andreas Papandreou, 
that the replacement of key officials should be 
accompanied by violence or imprisonment--as KYP and 
the junta were later to allege • ••• 
KYP was founded in 1950--its purpose to be roughly 

comparable to that of the American CIA, which, 

incidentally, helped start KYP • •••
· . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . 

That KYP was out to destroy Papandreou is very clear: 
to me. Takis Apostolopoulos, a key KYP agent, told 
me just a few days before the coup that he "would 
give my right arm to get Andreas Papandreou". Major
.Evangelos Tsaka:, now a special counselor to Minister 
of the Prime Ministry Papadopoulos, also said to me 
that Papandreou "ought to have been killed that same 
night of the coup. \ve should get rid of him.". • •• 
• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 
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In June of 1966, the KYP agent Apostolopoulos, 

known to me then by the name Varikopoulos, came to 

me and said that he wanGed the copies of the 

memoranda I had prepared for Andreas two years before. 

He told me that in the investigation of Papandreou, 

already underway for two years, there were materials 

incriminating me, too • ••• 

I finally gave in and said I would permit KYP to 

make copies of the memorBnda, provided the originals

weI'e returned to me. 30, the agent took me to the 

KYP build ing in Athens. • •• 

They took the memoranda~ay from me into a room 

where I was told there was a photographic machine. 

T~n minutes later, several KYP agents returned and 

told me, lI we have decided 'lio keep tne documents and 

not give them back to you. You cem go." ••• 

KYP agent Apostolopoulos came to me again and told 

me ~hat they wanted me to write down everything that 

had happened between myself and Andreas Papandreou

in 1964. I did so, making clear that I thout;ht he 

was an honest man, and a democrat, who would do the 

right thing in Greece. 

Apostolopoulos threatened me with being charged as 

an accomplice and subjected to length imprisonment. 

Facing that charge and the warning that unpleasant 

things might happen to my wife and son, I agreed to 

sign a document prepared by them. It claimed that 

Andreas Papandreou was about to organize a coup

d'etat by a group of dissatisfied young officers, 

that he was planning to remove the King, and to take 

Greece out of NATO, and that he was in general guilty' 

. of pro-communist sympathies and treasonous activities. 
Of course, none of the charges were true. :'00 . 
On the 6th day of September at 6:00 p.m., the 
three armed KYP agents took me to the public . 
prosecutor's office, where I gave perjured testimony •• o~ 
I left for Paris in August of this year, letting

KYP think I was going Lhere on its behalf to spy on 

a conference of Greek democrats in exile. I did not 

go back. • •• 

KYP probably thought they could insure my return to 

Greece by forbidding my wife and son to leave Greece 

with me ••••
· . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .,. .. 
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I was able to have my wife and son secretly picked 
up by a chartered airplane and flown to Paris to 
join me four days later. 
The second ~estimony is that of Kyriakos 
Diakogiannis, who claims that he was also unwillingly 
forced by the Greek CIA to fabricate false evidence 
against Andreas Papandreou: 65 
My involvement in the frame-up of Andreas 
Papandreou began in June of 1964, when I wes 
introduced to Andreas Vachliotis, an Athens 
lawyer and friend of Papandreou. AfLer a series 
of long discussions, Mr. Vachliotis and I 
a~reed that in Papandreou resided the best 
hope for the renaissance of Greek democracy, and 
together we drafted, at Papandreou's request a 
number of proposed reforms in various areas 
of Greek political life • ••• 
In August, I returned tu Athens, where Vachliotis 
introduced me to a KYP agent, Takis Apostolopoulos,
who promptly ushered us into the office of Premier 
Stefanopoulos • ••• 
After an interrogation and briefing by Takis and 
Major Tsakas of KYP, I gave a sworn statement 
before a judge of Instruction, recounting the events 
exactly as they occurred-with one important difference. 
I was also asked to attest that Vachliotis had related 
to me a conversation between himself and Papandreou, . 
in which the later had purportedly advocated the use. 
of violent means to eliminate his opposition. Mr. 
Vachliotis had never told me anything of the sort. 
In their search for treasonable lI evidence" against
Papandreou, KYP was obliging us to perjure ourselves, 
with thinly veiled threats to our persons and those 
of our families • ••• 
65Kyriakos Diakogiannis, "The Testimony of Kyriakos 
Diakogiannis" Ramparts, VI (October, 1967), p. 46. . 
The imaginary conversation to which I attested 

went in sUbstance like this: 

Papandreou (reading our proposal to replace key· 
military and police officials with trustworthy men):
But you haven't said how this should be accomplished. 
Vachliotis: Gradually, after careful selection ••• 
Papendreou (smiling ironically): This kind of 
affair only succeeds when the heads begin to roll ••• 
I was later assured by KYP agents, Takis and others 
that my perjured testimony and that of Mr. Vac'.hliotis 
were the secret foundation stones of the State's 
case against Papandreou, to be sprung on an ­
unsuspecting defense at his impending trial. 66 
As the divison and political struggle between the 
King and George Papandreou became public, the whole 
country cume close to political anarchy. 
Young people (mostly University students)took to 
the streets in support of George Papandreou; clashes with 
the police occurred almost daily.67 
Members of Parliament, enraged over the recent 
events, carried the fight into Parliament, which was daily 
turned into a wrestling 'ring; it became common and 
necessary for the Athens police to intervene whenever 
a fight erupted.68 
66Kyriakos D-iakogiannis escaped from Greece on 
July 10, 1967. ' 
1967 
Proedrias 
1967) , 
52 
Strikes by laborers in support of George Papandreou 
-also were common. The nation became so paralyzed by such 
strikes that army personnel and police officers were 
often called to fill the vacancies created by the striking 
workers. 59 
Papandreou's popularity was so strong, that the 
King found it impossible to successfully establish a 
government without him. It seemed that the only way 
that Papandreou could be eliminated from the political 
scene was by some non-electoral means. What this means 
was, became evident at 2:30 a.m. the twenty-first of 
April 1957. 
69Ibid , p. 97-102. 
CHAPTER IV 
HOW IT IS NOW 
The new Greek Constitution of 1968 has not been 
fully implemented. 
According to Article 138 of the new Constitution, 
all power and authority rests with the junta. Basic 
freedoms, such as free assembly, free elections, and free 
speech are postponed indefinitely until the regime deaides 
to permit such freedoms. 
However, in other sections of the 1968 Constitution,: 
the junta has moved towards accomplishing a national 
reorganization. 
The military dictatorship claims to have achieved 
a number of changes in Greece during the last two years.70 
The regime claims that "it relieved the administrati<m 
from the party spirit", but it has not yet brought into 
effect Article 123 of the new Constitution, which provides 
in part that "public servants are in the service of the­
people".71 
70Two Years Of Creative Activity, A Greek Government 
Publication (Athens: Minstry To the Prlme Minister, Press 
and Information Department, 1969), p. 6-21. 
?lIbid • 
In the economic sector, the regime claims to 
have increased the subsidies for agriculture by about 
14.5 billion drachmae,72 for country roads by 2.4 billion 
and for housing loans by 1.4 billion, and to have 
reorganized the bureaucracies to facilitate economic 
development. 73 
In its drive to~ing about national change in 
agriculture, the regime indicates that it is striving 
for the following. 74 
1. Mechanization of agriculture,
2. Intensive cultivation in place of extensive 
cultivation, 
3. Profitable yield CUltivation instead of limited 
yield cultivation, and 
4. National reorganization of agriculture on the 
basis of recent scientific developments. 
The regime has encountered some active opposition 
in its efforts to reorganize agriculture. This opposition 
had resulted in open physical violence, as indicated in 
the following by the Associated Pres~, r~ported in 
72The drachmae is the basic monetary unit in Greece. 
As of April 4, 1970 the official rate of exchange was 30 
drachmae to one U.S. dollar. 
73frwo Years Of Oreative ActiVit~". A Greek Government 
Publica tlon (Athens: Ministry To lJ:heI-ime Minister, Press 
and Information Department, 1969), p. 10-11. 
74Ibid. 
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The Oregonian: 75 
A reliable so~rce said fhursday rioting

farmers u;,ing pitchforks battled police in 

central Greece, leaving 55 persons inj'ured and 

60 under arrest. The rioting broke out 

Monday as hundreds of farmers protested 

possible government expropriation of land. The 

fighting swirled around the village of Megalo 

Kalivia in central Greece, the source said. 

Farmers wielding pitchforks and sticks 

:lashed with police in a two-hour battle. Of 

'ose injured, 15 were police. 

In the field of social services, the regime has 

76 

set the following goals: 

1. Allocating of two billion drachmae by 1972 for 

the development of modern hospitals,

2. Establishment of medical dispensaries, as 

well as hygienic er'luipment allover the country, and 

3. Granting up to 1. 4 billion drachmae to farmers 

for housing, and the erection of 1,700 new houses 

for refugees. 

In the field of national education, the regime claims 
that: 77 
1. The promise of free education became a fact 

under the regime.

2. Books, manuals, laboratory truining, etc. are 

offered free of any charge at"all,

3. The amount of 504 million drachmae were 
proclaimed for the construction of school buildings,and 
4. Loans will be reimbursed by the students unde~ 

favourable terms, two years after their gradu~tion. 

7511Greek Police Fight Rioters", The Oregonian, April 

11, 1969, p. 1. 

. 76Two Years Of Creative Activit.I, A Greek Government 
'Publicatl'on (Athens: Ministry To The 'Prime Minister, Press 
and Information Department, 1969).p. 11-14. . 
77~, p. 12-15 
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Although the above would be impressive, if true, 
such measures by themselves would not necessarily 
improve the quality of education. Educators must be 
left free to exercise tbeir professional judgements and 
responsibilities in their daily classroom duties. According 
, several Greek friends (see footnote number 1), however, 
0ducators have been turned into propaganda media for the 
,.;ime". Educators are told what they can and cannot say 
in the classroom. It was indicated, fOJ' example, 
that while a teacher was lecturing in the class, he 
accidentally used the word "democracy", a forbidden word 
in Greece. Upon bearing this, the police authorities 
:)rrested the teacher and subsequently gave him a prison 
sentence. 
While new classrooms can brighten the educational 
sceiln and ease tbe free exchange of ideas, this is not 
presently the case in Greece. Instead, classrooms have 
become prisons of minds to facilit~e only poisonous 
propagand'a to serve the "mastersll. 
In its effort to receive tbe support of the labor 
class in Greece, the regime apparently aims according 
to article 27 of the Constitution, to "ensure employment 
for labour and protect them from the point of view of 
working and remuneration condition~ in order. to effect 
their moral and material elevatiorl,.78 
78Ibid , p. 14-15. 
, . 
It is not clear how far governmental action has 
in fact improved the condition of the workers. However, 
there are no known administrative measures taken by the 
government to implemen~ the above constitutional provison. 
Under present economic conditions, it would appear 
difficult for the regime to undertake the large public 
expenditures required to meet projected goals. An 
indication of the problem is expressed in the following 
quotation from Free Greece: 79 
Exports last year went up only 12 million 

dollars from the 452.6 million dollars earned 

in 1967. Tourism receipts dropped for the 
second year in a row, from 126.8 million dollars 
to 120.3 million dollars. Before the military 
take-over, tourism had been growing rapi~ly and 
according to fDrecasts, should have earned 156 
million dollars last year. With foreign debt 
due to rise by 83 million dollars this year 
from 428 million on December 31, 1968, it is 
estimated that the total national debt will 
be 1.88 billion dollars by the end of 1969, 
more than five times the country's expected
total assets in gold and foreign currencies. 
The regime has made many promises to the people, but 
things just do not happen by promises alone. Besides 
resources, a government needs good administrators 
with the talent and brains to carry out economic programs. 
Because Greece is not a country of abundance, it is 
a must that its resources be administered very carefully 
7911Greece 1 s Economic Condition", Free Greece, (April, 
1969), p. 2. 
• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 
• • • • • • • • • • • • • • •• • • • • • • • • • • 
58 

and that they be used in the IIrightll place to yield 
the best results. 
During the early months of the military regime, it 
repeatedly sought to acquire the !lbrains ll of Andreas 
Papandreou* while he was in prison charged with high 
treason. These efforts apparently failed: 80 
The Greek military junta has asked Andreas 

Papandreou, the political leader whom it has 

jailed on charges of high treason, to advise 

it on economic matters., 

This overture by Greece's military leaders to the 
man they have labeled their archenemy was revealed 
Saturday night by Brig. S~ylianos Patakos, minister 
of the interior • ••• 
Patakos visited Papandreou with Ioanis Rodinos­
Orlandos, under secretary of' coordination and one 
of the officials mainly responsible for directing the 
country's economy. . 
Rodinos-Orlandos told papandreou that he considered 
him his teacher, and that he had studied his books 
on economic development • ••• 
The minister, backed by Patakos, then urged
Papandreou to state his opinion on the Greek 
economy, to comment on the measures taken so far 
and to suggest what else should be done. Both 
officials told Papandreou that the charges
against him need not prevent him from contributing, 
as a Greek, to the country's economic progress.
Papandreou scid that since all he had read about 
current events for the past six mon~hs was in the 
government- controlled~ess, he was in no position 
80If"Greeks Seek Advice from Jailed Leader", The Oregonian, 
October 9, 1967, section I. p. 2. 
*Andreas Papandreou is an economist of note and for 
a number of years was head of the department o£ economics 
at the University of California at Berkeley. 
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to judge the situation. 
Rodinos-Orlandos then urged the prisoner at 

least to sum up in one word his impression of how 

things were going. 

Papandreou said; "Monstrously". 

After renewing their appeals for help, the 

officials left. A few days later, another official 

in the coordination ministry appeared at the prison. 

He told Papandreou that the government would send 

him any economist or group of economists he might 

designate in the economic ministries or the 

central bank to provide him with whatever data 

statistics he might need. However, Papandreou

reiterated his refusal. 

It is very difficult to acquire any further solid 
information concerning the economic situation in Greece. 
The difficulty stems from the fact that any news concerning 
the economy of the country is managed and edited by the 
government. The press can only print what the government 
permits; inquiries into the economic affairs of the 
country are "disc ouraged" • 
Unfortunately, the political and social life of the 
Greek people does not appear to be in better health than 
the nation's economic life. The situation is characteriz~d 
by terror and intimidation. The country is ruled by 
military decree. People have rights only when ~he junta 
decides to give them on a particular day, hour or minute. 
The following cases are presented with the hope 
that ttley will give a clear view of what is happening in 
81Greece today. The cases are reported in Free Greece.
81"Gr eece Today", Free Greece, (June-July, 1968), p. 3-29. 
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Case I. They took my friend X from his house 
at nine in the morning. He returned t~o hours 
after midnight. ~fuat happened during the 17 hours of 
his absence? At the time we knew nothing. Later 
his wife persuaded him to talk to me in confidence. 
They had shown him a photograph of an election 
meeting--there was to have been a general election. 
They asked him to identify himself on the photo, 
He did. There was no further questioning. They
started beating him up with truncheons, fists, 
kicks. 'llhere were five of them. '.L'hey were 
hitting him on the head, allover the body. 
They were kicking his genitals. They revived 
him, made him say "Long live the King", then 
'!Long live the revolution II. From time to time 
they IIrested". Others were being treated in 
the same way. He could see them or hear them 
scream. "It was only 17 hours for me" he said, 
'because I am oldish and frail, for the young
it was hell". " 
~here was a boy who had been having this for 

the fifth day. They would give you as much as 

they thought you could take, short of dying. I 

think they had orders not to kill. 

Case II. At last they let X go with the 

warning that if he dared to see a do~tor, if 

he dared tell anyone, all this would start 

again. 

\vhen I saw him two weeks after it ha ppene~d, his 

arms were blue on the inside because he had covered 

his face with them. His chest, his back, his 

legs were blue. . His face 5'wllen and red. His 

geniuals swollen, bruised and aching. He could 

not breathe or cough freely. He told me th~y 

were beating him with fists on tho region of 

the heart. They were telling him that they 

would "kill his heart". Be had two ribs brOken. 

Day after day I he rd of more cases like this. 

I saw a boy with a dislocated spine.

The working-class districts were especially hit. 

(I can speak only of Athens and Piraeus. I heard 

of terrible things in Salonica~ but there I have 

no personal knowledge).

Men from 17 up to 70 were selected, mostly from 

photographs of political meetings, or sometimes 

for things they had said when all this was legal, 

when we were free. 

The people of the free countries ' ':cused us of 

accepting the colonel's coup apathetically. We 

were never apathetic. We were struck dumb. We 

knew that the whole of the nation's leadership 
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had been arrested. 
'vJe felt helpless, alone and unarmed, facing 
tanks and brutality. The radio was shouting blood 
thunder. 
Case III. They hit the soles of her feet with 
sticks and when her skin cracked they made her 
walk on the rocky ground. Then they said they 
would kill her. They blindfolded her and, still 
ha1f-nak~d, she stood for execution. They fired 
in the air and the girl collapsed. This is called 
"moc k execution". 
They drove her to the security police station 
at Boubou1inas street. They threw her into an 
underground cell. Four days without food or 
water. She could count the hours by the changing 
of the guard. She did not know if it was day or 
night. It was cold. There were no blankets. Only 
the damp cement floor and crawling little beasts 
which horrified her. 
On the fourth night she was brought out for 
interrogation. The same questions, the same 
threats. 
They tied her to a bench. One man beat the soles 
of her feet, another pulled her hair and banged 
her head on the bench, others twisted her arms. 
They screamed insults. 
One moment they would all be raging, suddenly 
someone would be kind. Would she not confess? 
She refused. Immediately the "hard" men would 
reappear and the beating lrlou1d start again. 
Case IV. There was another operation in hbnd, 
"Intimidation". Nobody is s(;:cure in his job. 
Thousands are fired. Thousands are threatened. 
To keep your job you have to sign a certificate 
of loyalty. You have to inform on anyone disloyal. 
In spite on everything, the young people
started resisting. ~ri~ing ,on the wall, 
prin~ing leaflets, and distributing them. Arrests 
are immediate. 
Torture now has another purpose. It is aimed 
at extracting information. 
Case V. I will give the case of a young man of 
187'tre-w8s taken by the security police and thrown 
into an underground cell. ,There was no light 
whatsoever. He could not know whether it was night 
or day. TheI'e was nothing but 11e coarse cement 
floor. 
He was left there for a week without food or 
water. A kind policeman furtively brought him 
a little yogurt on two occasions. 
On the seventh day he was brought out for 
interrogation. Who had given him the leaflets? 
Who else was involved. Why not answer? He would 
have to anyway ••• "after". 
They threw him down and tied his legs to a chair. 
They started hitting the soles of his feet with 
twisted wire, then with thin sackfuls of sand. 
His feet swelled and blistered and the skin 
cracked. The blood oozed down his legs. At the 
same time others were hitting his body, his head. 
~hey tore his shirt and started beating him on 
the breast. He thinks it was with truncheons. 
At the beginning he was screaming, so they put 
a dirty rag in his mouth. 'l'hey pressed his 
neck. He fainted. He was brought- to with a 
bucket of water thrown in his face. 
The beating on his feet started again while 

another torturen twisted his genitals. He kept

fainting. He would be no man any more, he was 

told. 

Similar accounts of such tortures, given by 
Greeks who escaped from Greece, were published by 
Look Magazine in 1969. 82 
The regime aims by torture and intimidation to 
keep the people quiet through fear. Young people are 
the m&jor target. Reportedly, hundreds of them go through 
the many security police stations just to be beaten and 
frightened. 
Despite the h0rsh methods use6 by the junta to 
silence opposition, opposition has not been crashed. 
[l'he Greek people , although terrori2Jed and with their leaders 
in jail, have done their best to show their resistance to 
the present dictatorship. 
820hristopher Wren, IIGreece: Government by Torture", 
Look, (May 27, 1969), p. 19-21. 
An interesting resistance technique is indicated 
in the following account by Par2de: 83 
The milit~ry junta of colonels which now 
runs Greece hus imprisoned thousands of 
political opponents, but the colonels have 
not ~et succeeded in silencing the resistance. 
The patriotic front or PAM bas found an inf'enious 
way of making its cry for freedom heard: T-i 
fused tape recordings. 
First the PAM worker rents a well situate'l 
'e­
office or a delivery truck. In it he pltm i 
tape-recording anti-junta speech, with sev' 
minutes of lead-in silence recorded be~ore 
; 0 
"1 
speech begins. He then turns the machine 
and has time to disappear before the machinnon 
blares out his illegal message • ••• . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Underground newpapers, which must be printed 
secretly and often by crude methods in order 
to avoid suspicion, are also boomin~ in Greece. 
~here are at least ten in operation, with the 
most widely read, Nea Rellada (New Greece), 
celebrating its 25th issue this month. 
It is evident that, despite terroristic methods, 
. -Ie junta has not succeeded in breaking the spirit of 
the Greek population. 
The colonels at first declared that the intention 
of "their" revolution was only to eliminate the threat of 
a conuunist take-over. However, they have arrested 
or exiled not only left-wingers, but middle-of-~he­
roaders, right-wingers, and anyone else that they consider 
a threat to the regime. 
83"Greek Resistance", Parade, (February 2, 1969), p. 7. 
,,1 
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At times the ac~ions of the regime appear to make 
no sense at all, as indicated in the fOllowing: 84 
The true nature of the Greek military

dictatorship is revealed in the fatH of 

Maj. Gen. George B. KoumanaKos, who gained 

international renovm fighting communists in 

the field of battle and is now completing his 

17th month of imprisonment by the colonels 

who claim they have saved Greece from communism. 

The KoumanaKos case is another example,

dismally frequent in this gener&tiun, of 

Karka come to life. No formal chare;e is 

pending, no trial is scheduled, no fixed 

limit tl'':lS been pllt on his captivi;~y. Under­

lining the Kafk~esoue touch, KoumanaKos had 

kept scrupulously free of political connections-­

unlike many fellow Greek officers. 

Why then is he imprisoned? For precautionery 

reasons. Koumanakos, a living legend in the 

Korean war as the fearless co~mander of the 

Hellenic Expeditionery Forces, is a patriot who 

some d8y conceivably might oppose the present 

tyrants. Thus, the junta took no chances with 

a potential rebel. 

Koumanakos is one of many. The distinguished 
Adm. Athanasios Spanides, 66, is beginning his 
14th consecutive month of detention in a Greek 
village. A brigadier, one of the Army's most 
daring officers, is in poor health after 
sufferin~ head injuries (suppasedly in a diving
accident; while in captivity. A highly respected 
retired major general who responded to his recent 
early morning arrest by slapping the face of the 
arresting officer was beaten bloody by securicy 
troops. 
But the case of Koumanakos is perhaps the 
closest to Kafka because of his valorous and 
wholy non-political career.--So circumspect was 
he about keeping out of politics that he purposely 
8~vans Rowland, and Robert Novak, "Greek Hero 
Suffers Kafaes~Jue Fate", Th~ Oregonian. June 27, 1969, p. ,6. 
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went abroad in the spring of 1967 to avoid 

the national election campaign that was 

cancelled by the colonels' COUp of April

27, 1967. 

Assuming that he had nothing to fear from 
anti-communist fellow officers, Koumanakos returned 
to Greece May 17. Seven days later he was arrested 
at his home without charge. 
It seems that the colonels are determined to 
eliminate any Greek, regardless of ideology, who is 
capable of leaoArship. Papadopoulos is determined, it 
seems, to brinf' lihe minds and bodies of every Greek man, 
woman, and child, to his mercy. Naturally the easiest 
way to accomplish this is by separating the "heads" from 
the "oodies". 
Despite great pressures against the regime by 
other n~tions for the return of democratic government 
and the basic freedoms to the Greek people, the military 
dictatorship has made slight response. Occasionally 
Papadopoulos will make an announcement (when under fire 
from other European nations) which seems to carry some 
hope that the military tyranny will end, but the hope 
always remains unfulfilled. 
It is very clear that Papadopoulos, while trying 
to give the impression of a "great libertarean ll , is 
determined to continue ruling Greece by military 
decree. 
The calculated use of window-dressing by the 
66 
regime is indicated by the following: 85 
Last week, in a move calculated to convince 
the world that he and his colleagues really were 
civil libertarians after all, Premier George 
Papadopoulos announced that three of the 
suspended constitutional guarantees- the 
inviolability of the home, the rightm
peaceful assembly and the right to form 
associations-were being restored immediately.
His first intention, Papadopoulos cheerily
told a press conference, had been to disclose the 
new measures on April 21, the second anniversary
of the coup that brought the junta to power. But 
on second thought, he explained, he had decided 
to make the announcement on the eve of the 
Greek Orthodox Baster celebrations. Most 
observers, however, agreed that Papadopoulos'
timinG was less influenced by ~aster spirit
than by the NATO meeting under way last week 
in Washington. At least four NATO nations-­
Denmark, Norway, the Netherlands and Italy-­
had indicated that they would challenge 
Greece's fitness for membership in the alliance 
at the Washington meeting. And by his partial 
restoration of civil rights Papadopoulos clearly 
hoped to blunt such criticism. 
Whatever happened in Washington, however, the 
new measures appeared to be little but window 
dressing. Since nine of the constitutional 
guarantees remain suspended, individual Greeks still 
have no protection against such abuses as 
arbitrary arrest. 
liThe new measures don't mean a great deal in 
practical terms", conceded one American official 
familiar with Greek affairs. 
In another article by Time, the following 
observation was made: 86 
85l1Greece: Window Dressing", Newsweek, LXXIII 

(h~ril 21, 1969), p. 52-55. 

86 11 Why Greece's Colonels Are That Way!!:, Time, 

(April 18, 1969), p. 32-33. 
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Rather like a stern father rewarding good 
behavior, Premier George Papadopoulos last week 
returned several previous liberties to the 
Gr'eek people. He was observing both the 
Easter season and the $econd anniversary of 
the coup that ousted the previous government and 
brought Papadopoulos and his fellow army colonels 
to power. He was also trying to head off 
criticism of the Greek regime from the NATO 
ministers' meeting in Washington. Announced 
the Prime Minister: 1) freedom of assembly 
and association will be restored; 2) homes 
will be off limits to policemen without warrants; 
3) press censorship will be reviewed; 4) some of 
the nearly 2,000 political exiles who have been I
held on Aegean island.s may be brought home,· , I 
and some government employees ousted by the 
regime will get their jobs back. Papadopoulos 
seemed not to notice one irony: The press 
conference revealing all these freedoms was 
held in the now vacant Senate chamber of the 
Parliament building in Athens. One freedom 
that the birthplace of democracy has not 
recovered is a democratic assembly.
Such subtlet~es apparently do not trouble 
Papadopoulos and his colonels because they are 
elementary men. Or so it seems, for in a complex
world they are trying to forge an anachronistically 
simplistic nation. Long hair is now immoral 
for schoolboys; the government has ordered hair­
cuts, and in some cases police wiellled the shears them­
selves. Bouzouki tavernas, where high-spirited 
Greeks loved to smash crockery in time with the 
frenzied music, have been tamed: guests are no 
longer allowed to break even a single saucer. 
Miniskirts are forbidden for young girls, and 
bar girls are being discouraged. Government 
officials must attend church--other Greeks are 
urged to do so to build a nation of "Christian 
Greeks"--while anyone who publicly doubts God 
or the army may be held guilty of blasphemy.
TWese spiritual upliftin~s are hastened, opponents
of the military government say, by torture as well 
as exile. "Christians behave themselves because 
they are afraid of going to hell", explains 
Deputy Prime Minister Stylianos Patakos. 
"Likewise, under our regime, Greeks behave 
because they are afraid. Only the bad people 
are going to be punished". 
The military regime of Greece eVidently has .. 
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chartered the course which the Greek people must 

follow. It has determined what needs to be done, and 

no'dissent by the Greek people is permited. If anyone 

dares to challenge the reasoning of the "wise men" 

(Papadopoulos and his lieutenants) , he is , as Deputy 

Prime Minister Pattakos says, "punished ll For
• 
, persuading the Greek people to accept their physical 
and moral liberation, the colonels do not use 
rea'son, apparent'ly because they are not reasonable 
men. Instead, they use threats, violence and exile 
to implement their-decisions. 
No civil body in Greece has power except thot 

whicQ is allowed by the military regime. The Greek 

Constitution of 1968 has became the tool for the 

mili~ary dicta~orship to continue its'repressive, 
terroristic, ~a~d a~tocratic rule, while providing 

no trme table at'all for a return to democratic and 

parliamentary.government in Greece. Article 138 

.. 87of, the 1968 Greek Constitution p.rovides that: 
The present'C~nstitution, after ~t~ approval
by the Greek Pe,ople through Eeferendum, 
. signed by .t·he 'Council of Ministers and published 
.in the Gove,rnment Gazette, comes into immediate I 
87Constitution Of Greece 1968, A:Greek Government 
Publication (Athens: The Oouncil of Ministers, The Prime '. 
. Etnister,The Deputy Prime Ministers, The ·Ministers, 1968), 
p. 56'. 
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effect, with the except~on of to§ provisions
of Artig1es 10, 12~ 13 § 1, 14 §§ 1-3, 18,
19, 25 §§ 2-3, 58 SS 1-2, 60, 111, 112, 121, 
§ 2, which provisions the National Revolutionary

Government is authorized to place into effect 

through acts published in the Government Gazette. 

The regime, by acquiring the constitutional 
power to withhold or to put into effect the provisions 
of the constitution has the power to grant or to 
withhold: 88 
1. The right not to be arrested or imprisoned

without a judicial warrant. 

2. The right of a person arrested to be brought

before a magistrate within a reasonable period of 

time. 

3. The right to be tried by a competent judge 

as against that of judicial committees or military

tribunals. 

4. The right of home privacy as against

unreasonable searches without legal warrants or 

in a manner provided by law. 

5. The right of free expression, orally, or 

in print.

6. The right to worship asa person's conscience 

dictates. 

7. The right to establish representative 
government, and the establishment of judicial 
power.
8. The right to assemble peacefully, and to 

form associations. 

9. The right to freely establish political

parties and participate in them. 

10. The right of free community elections and 

or other local government elections for electing

local government leaders. 

The 1968 Constitution was created for the sole 
~urpose of perpetuating the dictatorial and police 
88Ibid p. 7-49. 
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powers of the present military dictatorship. 
The circumstances under which the Constitution was 
prepared and put to referendum, reflected not the 
wishes of Greek people, but that of the Colonels. The 
Constitution was formed under martial law and put to 
referendum in an atmosphere uf terror and repression. 
.' 
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CONCLUSION 
From the beginning of his election as premier of 
Greece in 1964, George Papandreou was never given the 
chance to form his own government. Immediately 
following his election, the King challenged Papandreou.~,s 
authority to appoint and fire members of his cabinet. 
It is difficult politically and administratively 
to carry out any governmental function if the Pri~e 
Minister is denied the authority to appoint cabinet 
ministers of his choosing. (The 1952 Constitution was 
not clear as to the King's powers over the appointments 
end dismissals of cabine members). 
Political chaos reigned from June, 1964 until the 
army coup d'~tat of April 21,1967. The near anarchy 
provided the rationale used by the army when it seized 
control of the government. 
The action of the army came as the country was 
preparing for national' elections, which would have 
tested the relative strength of the King and the 
Prime Minister. 
i 
As the time for the national elections approached 
'(less than one month before the army's GOUp d'etat), 
public opinion polls showed that Ge?rge Papandreou 
would win the elections with an overwhelming majority. 
'II! 
i 
Such a result would have been rightly interpreted as 
( 
a plebiscite against the King. 
As we know, the elections scheduled for 1967 never 
took place. The country has been run by military 
decree since the April 21, 1967 coup d'etat. The 
junta has complete power to rule the country as it 
wishes, and as long 8S it wishes. 
The whole Greek nation is ruled by the threat bt 
terror, and torture. The re-education of the Greek 
people has been assigned by the head of the military 
junta, Papadopoulos, to the police. The army ~ust 
sustain the permanent revolution and, acoording to the 
new Constitution, must see to the health of the state 
and to the training of the politicians. 
By virtue of the powers granded to the military 
junta by the 1968 Greek Constitution, the regime has 
and is exercising the power of withholding the rights 
of free speech, free assembly, free elections, free 
press and other basic and fu~damental rights. The 
present military regime gives no indication of plans to 
return the country to democratic ways. In fact, all 
present signs show that through radical reorganizations 
of pri'or democratic instit\ltions, the "junta f1 intends 
to implant itself and its ways in Greece permanently. 
According to one source,89 
89Roy Perrot, "Athens Is Talking About The Junta~s 
Permanency", San Francisco Chronicle, August 13, 1969,p. 6. (( , 
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One has only to see the new officers' houses 
springing up, or read the latest list of promotions
and commissarships in the government gazette, to 
se~ how quickly a new administrative class has 
been given a vested stay exactly as they are. In 
impoverished Greece, a good job is something 
to be tenacious about. 
Some of the strongest evidence of the colonel's 
hopes of permanency, and of the kind of Greece 
they are aiming for, is in the schools. A 
government which thinks of itself as a trancient 
caretaker does not make radical changes in the 
educational system, particularly of a kind which 
a democratic successor would have to reverse. 
In civics lessons, emphasis is laid upon duty to 
the State, obedience, the virtue of family life, 
all couched in a sort of fundamelist morality.
Teachers told me that modern histories which 
deal with cooperative agenCies, like the United 
Nations, were rejected in favor of older ones,. 
of a more nationalist bent. I 
From the age of nine, children now have to learn 
a "correct" and academic form of Greek called 
Katharevousa-in addition to the classical and 
modern versions of the language. "No wonder 
that younger children hardly know the names of 
basic things", said one headmaster. "The mental 
confusion is painful. We've gone back 50 years".
School children are also obliged to do weekly 
essays (set by the Ministry to ensure conformity) 
on the philosophy of Prime Minister Papadopoulod's
personal credo. The credo, ~hich leans on 
rhetorical Christian apothegms and heroic goals,
is contained in three volumes of speeches and is 
about the only literature to see book form in the 
last two yeers.
The school curriculum is one of the few clear 
indications that exist as to what the prime
minister means when he says that "maturity" is 
a prereqUisite of a return to democratic ways.
The reaction of the middle-class parents I met 
was precisely what it would be among their 
British or American counterparts. They 
are distressed at the indoctrination. 
It is very likely that if the Western Allies ao 
not actively intervene on behalf of the Greek people, 
another civil war, similar to the one against the 
PORTlAND STATE m~mERS1TY UBRA~Y 

communist terrorist that followed World War II, will 
be required before Greek people will be able to 
return to a democratic representative government. 
Unfortunately, there are no signs to date suggesting 
possible allied intervention. 
: 
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